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SPECIAL MEETING

OF THE

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1 APRIL 1948

SUMMARY

Action to be Taken

Action to be taken

Responsibility

1. Study the draft NSCID, as amended at the meeting, and submit comments to the Director of Central Intelligence.

All Representatives Present.

Action to be Taken by the Secretariat

1. Prepare and circulate the amended version of the draft NSCID to those present.

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SPECIAL MEETING

OF THE

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

PRESENT:

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkcetter (Chairman) CT V

Mr. W. Park Armstrong. Jr. STATE

Lieut. General S. J. Chamberlin ARMY

Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis NAVY

Major General G. C. McDonald USAF

SECRETARIAT Captain J. E. Fitzpatrick

Lieutenant C. T. R. Adams

ALSO PRESENT

CIA 25X1

> STATE Mr. Grant C. Manson

ARMY Colonel Harold G. Hayes Colonel Lionel C. McGarr

YVANRear Admiral E. E. Stone

Captain J. N. Wenger Captain Carl F. Espe

USAF

Major General C. P. Cabell Colonel Richard P. Klocko

A special meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for consideration of the proposed National Security Council Intelligence Directive relating to Communication Intelligence (COMINT) was held in Room 7117, North Interior Building, Washington, D.C., at 1300. 1 April 1948.

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ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER opened the meeting by stating his wish to outline the genesis of the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) draft to be considered at the current meeting. He said that when the Charter and Executive Order proposed by the United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB) had been referred to the Secretary of Defense Mr. Forrestal had examined the proposals.

After examination Mr. Forrestal informed the Director of Central Intelligence that he considered the problem one to be solved by existing National Security Council intelligence directives and that he had requested comments from the three service secretaries.

He continued that subsequent events had called forth the second memorandum (dated 22 March 1948) and the tentative National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) up for consideration at the current meeting. Turning to the business at hand, ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER suggested that the best procedure would seem to be to consider the draft NSCID paragraph by paragraph.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that before the discussions of the draft got under way he desired to clarify his status as a spokesman for the Department of the Army. He said that in view of the events of the preceding few days he had been unable to obtain the highest echelon reactions to the draft NSCID and consequently would have to reserve freedom of action until he could take the matter up with his Chief of Staff. He commented that he certainly could not abrogate the responsibility of his Chief of Staff over a military unit such as ASA. He commented that this general "charter" problem had acted to place him in this position of being asked to approve a measure which would in effect place the Chief of Staff of the Army on a subordinate level (insofar as COMINT matters would be concerned) to that occupied by the Army member of USCIB. He reiterated his state-ment that he was not empowered to take any final action during the current meeting, adding that he would nonetheless be glad to do what he could to assist in arriving at a commonly acceptable draft NSCID for submission to higher authorities within the member agencies.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER stated his opinion that it was singularly unfortunate that not all members present were invested with the necessary authority to take action on the draft, and expressed surprise that such a situation should have come about.

GENERAL CABELL said his position was the same as that occupied by General Chamberlin--namely, that he was not authorized to speak for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or the Secretary of the Air Force.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER repeated his statement of disappointment that some members were unable to represent their respective departments. He observed that if such a condition continued to exist no progress at all could be made.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that it appeared to him that this difficulty might be cleared up a bit by reference to the Navy's position in the matter. He said that he and ADMIRAL STONE were authorized to represent the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy insofar as the drafting of a recommended NSCID for submission to the National Security Council would be concerned, but this did not mean that they could bind the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy by statements made at the current meeting. He said it was his understanding that consideration of any draft which might be approved at the current meeting and forwarded to the NSC would appear as an item on the agenda for a future NSC meeting and that since the agenda will no doubt be circulated to members in advance of the meeting, the Chief of Naval Operations will have ample opportunity to consult with the Secretary of the Navy before the latter is called upon to make a decision on the matter.

GENERAL CABELL said that this was also his view.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that he of course could not "speak for the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations" in the sense of binding them to a predetermined course of action, but that he and ADMIRAL STONE could represent the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy in arriving at a mutually acceptable draft of an NSCID to be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy as a member of the National Security Council.

ADMIRAL STONE said this was a clear expression of his own views.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that his earlier statement would have to stand, however, adding that he could not concur in any final action at the present meeting but would be glad to contribute to the discussions.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER again expressed disappointment at the limitations which would have to be observed by some members but commented that "if that's the way things are, we will have to go ahead and do the best we can." He asked for initial comments.

MR. ARMSTRONG said he would like to review the Department of State's position. · He said that his Department had from the beginning of the "charter problem" taken the position that the National Security Council is the proper "parent" body for USCIB. He added that the Department of State still considers this to be Thus, he said, the draft NSCID up for consideration at the present meeting had returned the question of "parentage" to the sphere upon which the Department had previously expressed agreement. He added that, however, in examining this draft the Department of State representatives had concluded that certain changes might be mutually acceptable and beneficial to USCIB members. Thus, for example, he said, it had been considered that certain of the provisions in the draft might better be handled by later, implementing directives and some of the phraseology involving repetition could be improved. He added that the result of these conclusions took shape as an alternate draft of the NSCID which was somewhat shorter but essentially the same as the CIA's draft. He said that he wished to ask a procedural question in that at some time during the deliberations on the "charter problem" the Department of State desired that its alternate draft be put forward for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC). He asked whether those present desired to consider the two drafts simultaneously or preferred to postpone consideration of the Department of State's draft until the CIA's draft had been checked. He said that perhaps Admiral Hillenkoetter could decide how this should be handled.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he would leave the decision to members. The matter was discussed briefly and it was agreed to take the CIA's draft up first, to consider it paragraph by paragraph, and then to compare the resulting version with the alternate draft prepared by the Department of State.

GENERAL CABELL said he again suggested that the phrase "and unified_direction" be deleted from the Navy's proposed redraft of paragraph 1 of the NSCID draft. He said that otherwise the Navy's proposed paragraph was acceptable to him.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN read his proposed revision of paragraph 1 of the NSCID draft and commented that his version omitted the phrase "and unified direction" but was otherwise the same as the Navy's version. He said he would place a period after the words "such intelligence" and would delete the words enclosed by parentheses.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked MR. ARMSTRONG's opinion and the latter said he would prefer to reserve his comments until the Department of State's alternate draft had come up for consideration. ADMIRAL STONE endorsed the Navy's paragraph 1 as written.

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MR. ARMSTRONG invited attention to possible need for use of the phrase "there is hereby" since the NSCID will be an enacting document. ALL MEMBERS agreed to include this phrase.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he noticed that both in the CIA's draft and in ID's draft of paragraph 1 the phrase "under the National Security Council" had been omitted. He asked whether this omission had been decided upon for any special reasons.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that this USCIB-NSC relationship was defined in later paragraphs of the draft.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN commented that this phrase most certainly should not be left out of the draft completely, and COLONEL HAYES said that the phrase came in the preamble to the directive.

GENERAL CABELL said that his earlier comments had been made on the assumption that substitution of the Navy's paragraph 1 would involve deletion of the preamble.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that the substitution of the Navy's paragraph for the present paragraph 1 would not disturb the preamble.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he considered that paragraph 1 might be a good place to define the relationship of USCIB to the NSC anyway, since this would establish the concept early in the directive. MEMBERS discussed this suggestion and agreed to include the statement of relationship.

DISCUSSION then returned to the phrase "and unified direction." ADMIRAL INGLIS said that ADMIRAL STONE had indicated a desire to leave the "and unified direction" phrase in the paragraph.

ADMIRAL STONE said he would defer to the wishes of the members in this matter and that hence he would go along with the deletion of the phrase. He recalled, however, that this same matter had been exhaustively discussed in USCIB meetings and inclusion of the disputed phrase had been agreed upon. He said, however, that if those present at the current meeting favored omitting the phrase, he would defer to their wishes; adding that, in substance, the phrase "authoritative coordination" might be interpreted to mean approximately the same thing as "unified direction." He commented, however, that one reason for inclusion of both phrases had been the fact that both appear in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA).

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he agreed with ADMIRAL STONE, and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER concurred, adding that he would rather have both phrases included but would accept deletion of the "unified direction" phrase in deference to the desires of other members of the Committee.

GENERAL CABELL raised a question as to whether the preamble should specifically cite Section 101 as well as 102 of the NSA or was necessary at all. During subsequent discussion of the question whether any section of the Act should be mentioned specifically, MR. ARMSTRONG and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER emphasized that the terminology of the preamble was standard for all NSCID's and the former commented that Section 102 of the Act was included as a citation of authority. It was agreed to cite 101 and 102.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER read the revised preamble and paragraph 1 and asked for comments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he considered USCIB's function, with relation to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to include more than merely advising him regarding the "protection of the source" of COMINT.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN and ADMIRAL INGLIS discussed this aspect of the problem and the former maintained that:

- 1) "protection of sources" is all that is authorized by the NSA of 1947.
- 2) this fact does not operate to exclude all other types of advice concerning COMINT.

In reply, ADMIRALS HILLENKOETTER and INGLIS expressed the view that the NSA prescribes a number of functions other than "protection of sources" for the DCI. ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER mentioned the functions of "collecting" and "coordinating" the nation's intelligence as examples.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed the view that, if the DCI is to take a hand in the collection of COMINT, the scope and nature of such a plan should be defined and examined by the COMINT authorities and an appropriate provision therefore should be included in the NSCID establishing USCIB. He added his belief that while the other functions enumerated by ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER might apply to the general field of intelligence, the DCI's relationship with respect to COMINT is limited to the protection of sources.

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ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER observed that the law makes no exceptions.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN reiterated his belief that if COMINT is to be subject to the mentioned, additional functions of the DCI, resulting relationship should be minutely defined by the document formally establishing USCIB.

ADMIRAL INGLIS commented that these added functions are already in operation since the CIA "collects" COMINT from the producing agencies and "coordinates" COMINT, so received, with the rest of intelligence. He added that the COMINT producing agencies constitute one of the DCI's "sources." He added that the broader, simpler wording of the Navy's paragraph 1 made it desirable as an opening statement of the provisions of the NSCID.

ADMIR'L STONE asked whether it might be beneficial to insert the word "those" before the word "matters" and thus delimit the field of the DCI's jurisdiction over COMINT more clearly.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he believes that the DCI has no responsibility with respect to COMINT except that of "coordination."

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that the Navy's proposed paragraph l would have to be accepted if such was the General's belief.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN replied that he had no wish to delay proceedings, though he would prefer the Navy's paragraph 1 as amended thus far.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he would accept this version, as amended, and added that the word "those" would be inserted as suggested by ADMIRAL STONE.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER then invited attention to paragraphs 2, and 4 in that order.

MEMBERS present APPROVED these paragraphs as they appeared in the CIA's draft.

Proceeding to paragraph 5, ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER commented that the only changes over the same statements as they appeared in the Executive Order proposed by USCIB was the substitution of the NSC for the appelate body of four (Under Secretary of State and three Chiefs of Staff) proposed by USCIB.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said if he were Secretary of the Army he would reject this paragraph because it has the effect of making a perfunctory organ out of the NSC since two of its members would have no vote on any matters pertaining to COMINT.

During the succeeding discussion of this view, GENERAL CHAMBERLIN took the position that the Secretary of Defense's exercise of his privilege of securing unity of opinion within the armed services might result in two of the Secretaries attending an NSC meeting (for consideration of COMINT problems) and being under orders to vote a particular way. ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER and ADMIRAL INGLIS opposed this position, maintaining that by rewording of paragraph 5, by the intent and provisions of the NSA of 1947, and by precedent, occurrence of the situation foreseen by GENERAL CHAMBERLIN becomes highly improbable. With respect to the precedent aspect of the matter, they cited the Secretary of Defense's handling of the recently settled "dominant interest" problem. In connection with ADMIRAL INGLIS' comment that the Secretary of Defense "adjudicates" differences between the heads of the Services rather than silences the expressions of such differing opinions, GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated his belief that if the Secretary of Defense takes a disputed question under advisement the best settlement obtainable should be worked out at Secretary level rather than to have the problem referred up to the NSC since it would seem pointless for two of the disputants to go to the NSC meeting powerless to vote as they desire. this ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that the Secretary of Defense might not always desire to force conformity at Secretary level but, on the contrary, might desire to refer the matter up to NSC after merely having received expressions of the varying opinions of Service Secretaries.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN observed that he hoped Mr. Forrestal would not take any such differences of opinion to the NSC, and ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed, adding that it would seem desirable to settle any such difficulties "within the family."

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked for additional comments and there there were none. ALL MEMBERS AGREED to go on to paragraph 6.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER commented that paragraph 6 had been included because under the present plan no Executive Order is to be obtained.

ADMIRAL STONF suggested adding the phrase "not inconsistent with the National Security Act of 1947."

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN recomm ded that paragraph 6 be omitted. He said he hoped that no unrealistic concepts would be permitted to shape parts of the NSCID, adding that the Army has COMINT activities which are now exclusively under the jurisdiction of the theater commander. He said that inclusion of paragraph 6 would thus conflict with, and might destroy, one part of the internal organization of the Army.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER observed that exclusion of the paragraph would leave the door open to non-USCIB agencies entering the COMINT field.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if the purpose of paragraph 6 was to exclude such an eventuality, the paragraph should be specifically so worded.

COLONEL HAYES asked whether this latter point was not covered by paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the draft, and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER agreed that these paragraphs did so, and in some detail.

GENERAL McDONALD asked whether the NSC controls the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that he knew of no pertinent exceptions to the NSC's jurisdiction over the executive and administrative branches of the government, adding that in any event the President is the common superior of both the NSC and the FBI.

MEMBERS discussed this item briefly and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that paragraph 6 be by-passed for the moment and that paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 be checked to see whether they cover the same concepts as 6.

ALL MEMBERS AGREED and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER noted that both paragraph 7 and 8 were identical with the corresponding paragraphs in the Charter which had been approved by USCIB.

MEMBERS AGREED to accept paragraphs 7 and 8 and to delete paragraph 6.

Turning to paragraph 9, ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that, except for the first sentence, the paragraph was identical with the one that appeared in the old draft of the USCIB Charter.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked for a definition of the phrase "competent authority in the COMINT field" and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that, to him, this phrase meant Captain Wenger and Colonel Hayes; i.e., the heads of the COMINT operating agencies.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked whether this was to be taken to mean that the Chief of Staff of the Army is not a "competent authority" and hence can not issue an order relating directly to COMINT.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said "of course not", adding that the Chief of Staff is an official of a "member department" and hence is not intended.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN read paragraph 9 and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER commented that, other than the first sentence, the wording was identical with that approved by USCIB in the draft Charter. He said the intent and purpose of paragraph 9 is to reserve to USCIB member departments or agencies the control over COMINT.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he could not tell his Chief of Staff that the latter can not give an order regulating COMINT activities of the Army. He added that his Chief of Staff had asked him what the "competent authority" meant and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN had been forced to reply that he did not know precisely.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER commented that the Chief of Staff would go through normal command channels in issuing such an order and that this would mean that the order would come through the Director of ID, a member of USCIB. Thus, he added, the paragraph means that the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations will not issue an order directly to the heads of their respective COMINT operating agencies, but instead will go through normal command channels which will mean that the order will reach the operating agencies via the departmental representatives on USCIB.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN repeated his statement that he is unable to issue orders directly to some Army COMINT units since they are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the appropriate theater commander. He added that only operational orders go down the chain of command in such a situation.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he doubted whether any orders dealing with the technical aspects of COMINT would be promulgated without having them go through the Director of ID.

MEMBERS discussed this aspect of the problem and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN repeated his objection to paragraph 9 on the grounds that it in effect by-passes the Chief of Staff of the Army by placing subordinates (the Army members of USCIB) in a superior position and thus obliging the Chief of Staff to appeal to the NSC in order to dispute a decision made by such subordinates.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS asked whether GENERAL CHAMBERLIN had a counter proposal to paragraph 9 and the latter replied in the negative, adding that he was mainly interested in reaching a definition of the term "competent authority."

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked whether the Security Officer-arrangement in the Army would not provide the link required.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said "no" and added that the new Chief of Staff has made changes which result in the theater commander's being the sole, exclusive, and undisputed commander in his particular area. He added that this means the Staff can exercise only technical coordination and that all theater units, including the COMINT unit, exist to serve the theater commander.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he would welcome a suggestion as to how paragraph 9 might be more satisfactorily "spelled out."

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the words "such as the departments or agencies represented on the Board" could be inserted as a modifier of the phrase "competent authorities in the field----." He added that such an addition would restrict the latter concept to members of USCIB and to the NSC. He said that perhaps there was no need to spell this out in such detail, but that he had wanted to get the concurrence of those present that paragraph 9 in nowise restricts authorities in the Army from giving orders to all units under their command.

ADMIRAL STONE suggested substitution of the statement "issued by competent departmental and agency authority represented on the Board."

MEMBERS discussed this suggestion in light of the "theater commander" aspect of the problem and agreed to amend paragraph 9 as suggested and to accept it.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER read paragraph 10 and commented that it was a suggested change over the original wording of the draft NSCID.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he believed that the last sentence of the paragraph should conclude with words "has made <u>its</u>

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he did not perceive the point of the changes, and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked whether GENERAL CHAMBERLIN meant that the NSC should not issue any future directives regarding COMINT.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN replied that he could see little reason for USCIB's continued existence unless it can issue its own directives. He asked why it would be necessary to have USCIB if the Director of Central Intelligence were to issue the NSC's instructions regulating COMINT activities. He said he would agree, however, to pass over this point for the moment.

MEMBERS discussed paragraph 10 briefly, and accepted it as amended by substitution of the wording "has made its directives--."

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that except for substitution of the letters USCIB for IAC the paragraph was unchanged. He asked for comments.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN proposed rewording the opening sentence of the paragraph to read "USCIB shall act for the NSC to ensure full and proper implementation of Council directives by issuing such supplementary directives as may be necessary."

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER agreed that the implementing directives should be issued by the member departments or agencies of USCIB.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the point he was making was that USCIB should have the power to issue its own directives.

COLONEL HAYES said that an additional point was that the actual implementation of such directives within the member departments or agencies should be handled by the Departments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he agreed with this in principle.

GENERAL CABELL said the Air Force agreed in general with General Chamberlin's position.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN re-read his suggested wording and members discussed this suggestion.

MR. ARMSTRONG asked whether the suggested wording would not act to deprive the Director of Central Intelligence of a responsibility imposed upon him by the National Security Act wherein he is designated as the agent for carrying out the NSC's Intelligence Directives.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the principle embodied in the draft NSCID under consideration is that USCIB is being set up under the NSC independent of the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence, who will fulfill his obligations under the law by sitting as a member of USCIB.

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ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that because of the special nature of COMINT be believed he could agree to the principle stated by Admiral Inglis. He hastened to add, however, that solely in the case of COMINT would he agree to such an arrangement.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested use of the wording "shall be issued by USCIB and shall be implemented within member departments and agencies --."

MEMBERS discussed this suggestion and agreed to accept the wording "--shall be issued to and implemented by the member departments and agencies." (placing a period after the word "agencies.")

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER invited attention to paragraph 12 and commented that it was in effect a broad statement which probably could be deleted if members so desired.

ALL MEMBERS agreed to include paragraph 12 as written.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER turned to paragraph 13 and said it was unchanged from its counterpart in the draft Charter approved by USCIB. He asked for comments.

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested that the paragraph be converted from the negative to the positive approach by rewording it as follows: "The Board shall leave the internal administration and management of communication intelligence activities to the member departments and agencies."

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested substitution of the word "operation" in the first sentence which then would read "--leave the administration and operation of COMINT activities--."

MEMBERS discussed and accepted the amendments.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER read paragraph 14 and commented that it was a new version of the 14 appearing in the original draft of the NSCID.

ADMIRAL STONE said he also desired to offer an alternate version of the paragraph. He read his version.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he would agree to any of the three versions.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he believed paragraph 14 should be replaced with the paragraph of the draft USCIB Charter which had set up the Coordinator of Joint Operations.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he would have to object to this for Mr. Forrestal. He said that the Secretary of Defense had emphatically stated that the Director of Central Intelligence must perform the coordinating function, as required by the NSA.

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MR. ARMSTRONG suggested deleting the paragraph altogether on two grounds; one, that it tended to confuse the duties of the CJO with the overall coordinating responsibility of the DCI, and two, that the duties of the CJO would be more properly set forth in an implementing directive.

ADMIRAL STONE said he would go along with this, and GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he would too although he believed that it would just mean thrashing out the CJO issue later.

MR. ARMSTRONG reiterated that he considered the duties and responsibilities of the CJO would be best handled by an implementing directive under the NSCID.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he considered the CJO to be the key to the whole USCIB structure.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that he had drafted some tentative "implementing directives," including one dealing with the duties and responsibilities of the CJO, which would be passed out to members later in the day. He repeated, however, that the Secretary of Defense considers that the Director of Central Intelligence must do the coordinating and had pointed to the requirements of the NSA.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN commented that this would eliminate the need for a Coordinator of Joint Operations.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that his obligation to coordinate <u>national</u> intelligence operations does not mean that he will function as the coordinator of <u>joint</u> operations by member departments and agencies of USCIB.

GENERAL CABELL asked whether ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER considered that there is thus a continuing need for a Coordinator of Joint Operations (CJO) for USCIB. ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied emphatically in the affirmative but added that he must exercise the over all coordination preserbed by the NSA.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked for ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER's opinion as to whether the Secretary of Defense would accept the proposed NSCID if paragraph 14 were omitted and ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he thought so.

MEMBERS discussed this suggestion and agreed to delete paragraph 14.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER asked for comments on paragraph 15, adding that these definitions were the same as those used in the draft USCIB Charter.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN, inviting attention to the definition of COMINT, said that under this definition the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB) would come under USCIB's jurisdiction. He added that the Army did not desire this but did not know how to avoid it, and that he assumed the Director of Central Intelligence was of the same persuasion.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said that NSCID No. 6 already bears upon this matter.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed but invited attention to the fact that, in accordance with the present draft NSCID, unless this directive No. 6 specifically applies to COMINT it will have no effect.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked whether the FBIB does not come under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence and whether NSCID No. 6 does not, in a negative sense, exclude COMINT.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said he had been thinking primarily of positive measures.

CAPTAIN WENGER suggested that one step towards solution might be to include the phrase "other than foreign news and propaganda broadcasts."

MEMBERS discussed this problem and concluded that the definitions of paragraph 15 should be accepted without alteration. A short discussion arose regarding inclusion of the preamble and it was agreed that this should be retained in the new draft NSCID.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER invited MR. ARMSTRONG to outline the Department of State's draft NSCID.

MR. ARMSTRONG said his office had prepared an alternate version as a result of the belief that a better organized and somewhat shorter directive could be attained. He said that one change had been to reorganize the draft so that it proceeded from the general to the specific parts of the charter, and another had been to omit some features which, it had been considered, would more appropriately be handled by means of implementing directives or are already implicit in the language of the NSA. He outlined further differences between the Department of State's draft and the CIA's draft and added that those who had prepared the former paper had not considered command problems in the field because they had not believed that the NSCID would affect field commanders directly. He continued that the principle change was in the deletion of the second part of paragraph 1 of the CIA's draft and in a transfer of the relationship of USCIB to the Director of Central Intelligence to a new paragraph (paragraph 5), the concept of which also extends to all other relations between USCIB and the Director.

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ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he considered the Department of State's draft to be excellent, adding that one change he would suggest would be to include paragraph 8 of the CIA's draft.

MR. MANSON said that this was already included at the end of the Department of State's paragraph 4.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he didn't think paragraph 4 covered the matter completely and added his belief that paragraph 8 of the CIA's draft should also be included.

MEMBERS then discussed the Department of State's draft, and it emerged that some members were not prepared to consider it in detail at that time, but would prefer its reference to a working group for reconciliation with the CIA version. MR. ARMSTRONG, after further reviewing the differences between the two drafts, stated that in the interest of expediting the matter he was willing to take the CIA draft, as amended during the meeting, under advisement and inform the DCI as soon as possible as to the Department's concurrence or further suggestions.

ADMIRAL STONE suggested that this should be done by all members.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed and said that this need for study was what he had referred to in his earlier statement regarding his inability to bind the Department of the Λ rmy to any specific choice regarding the draft NSCID. He asked how long members would have for consideration of the draft.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER said he didn't know, adding that this matter would probably be up to Mr. Forrestal.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said he believed the IAC had better get this NSCID draft completed before being prodded by Mr. Forrestal again. ALL MEMBERS agreed with the wisdom of this suggestion.

<u>DECISION</u>: It was agreed that, subject to the reservations expressed during the meeting, the Central Intelligence Agency's draft NSCID as amended during this Special Meeting would be accepted. The Ad Hoc Secretariat was directed to prepare and circulate the amended version to those present for study and comment. It was agreed further that recipients of the amended draft would transmit their comments to the Director of Central Intelligence as early as practicable.

The Meeting adjourned at 1450.

C. T. R. ADAMS
J. E. FITZPATRICK
Ad Hoc Secretariat

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